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Capital Fixity and Mobility in Response to the 2008-09 Crisis: 




The 2008-09 global crisis challenges our understandings of the nature and persistence 
neoliberal strategies of development. Since then, the advanced capitalist neoliberal 
archetypes have stagnated while the emerging neoliberal capitalisms outperform. Despite 
such divergence, neoliberalism as a strategy of capital accumulation prevails. This 
suggests that a deeper understanding of contemporary capitalism is needed to help make 
sense of neoliberalism’s complex and robust dynamics. Our interest is both in comparing 
the high-growth, crisis-prone, middle-income emerging capitalisms and doing so using a 
spatial framework to generate unique insights. Therein we look to Turkey and Mexico. 
These two peripheral members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) uniquely border the world’s two most powerful advanced capitalist 
regional hegemons, the US and EU. Despite their significant geographical locations, there 
remains remarkably little comparative political economy analysis of these societies. 
Specifically, the Mexico–Turkey comparison can help explain how and why crisis-driven 
neoliberal strategies of accumulation in emerging capitalisms have been implemented and 
reinvented domestically (Muñoz Martinez, 2008; Marois, 2011). Such an explanation must 
take into account each society’s domestic political economy and its subordinate integration 
into the financial world market. As two ‘most different’ cases of neoliberal transformation 
Mexico’s and Turkey’s institutional landscapes and class structures maintain specificities, 
but in ways constitutive of the universal and structural competitive imperatives that define 
global neoliberal capitalism (cf. Albo, 2005; Brenner et al. 2010; Marois 2012).  
Our study responds to two notable gaps in the political economy and 
developmental literatures. The first gap has to do with the choice of comparative cases. 
Since 2008-09 many international commentators and academics have mainly focused on 
the fashionable BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) collective, which 
are presented as successful post-crisis cum new developmentalist cases of sustained 
economic growth. Mexico and Turkey are rarely considered part of this new 
developmentalist clique (perhaps for fear of having a less poetic acronym), despite also 
enjoying rapid economic recovery. Hence, the rich comparative experiences of Mexico and 
Turkey have yet to be fully excavated. The second gap has to do with the choice of 
analytical framework. Much of the research on emerging market crises and development 
are from case study institutionalist approaches. While providing important insights into 
domestic specificities, this often comes without reference to otherwise universalising global 
capitalist structures and underlying class exploitation (e.g., Öniş and Burak Güven, 2011). 
Our historical materialist geographical framework, by contrast, seeks to understand how 
Mexico’s and Turkey’s national specificities are constitutive of a still universal, if malleable 
and differentiating, form of global social rule that we understand to be neoliberal 
capitalism. We use the lens of capital fixity and mobility to reveal the specific dimensions 
of these processes and their class content. 
We take as our point of departure Mexico’s and Turkey’s official responses to the 
2008-09 global financial crisis. In distinct ways, the simultaneous interests of corporations 
and banks relative to the national fixing of capital and their mobility in the form of global 
investment heavily influenced each state authority’s policy responses to the crisis. The 
interests of the poor, workers, and peasantry, by contrast, found little traction. Rather than 
pitching this as evidence of either persistent national differentiation or developmental state 
resurgence, we argue that the responses of capital and state authorities in Mexico and 
Turkey actively reconstituted the global parameters of market regulatory design and 
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neoliberal social rule through each state’s distinct domestic policy formation and crisis 
management processes. The comparison analytically and concretely deepens notions of 
variegated capitalism and, in doing so, can inform counter-hegemonic strategies of 
contestation and change. 
 
 
A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST ALTERNATIVE: FRAMING CAPITAL FIXITY AND 
MOBILITY IN CRISIS 
 
Geographical political economy asks how social relations are territorially grounded and 
how space shapes and is simultaneously shaped by economic and political power and 
social struggle (cf. Swyingedouw 2000). Therein capital mobility and fixity are posed as 
two internally related dimensions of the same socio-spatial processes of capital 
accumulation (Brenner 1998). Contentious social forces and associated 
institutionalisations of power, which for our purposes involves class structures, capital–
labour relations, and state authorities, shape and constraint these processes. From a 
historical materialist perspective, it is important to recall that capital is defined as an 
exploitative and unequal social relation that exists between capital and labour, is 
historically specific, and is the way in which value is preserved and multiplied through the 
appropriation of surplus labour (Marx, 1978, p. 40). Moreover, as accumulated capital 
does not move in the form of production, money is necessary for the repositioning of 
productive processes (and, potentially, for the disciplining of relatively fixed working 
populations via capital mobility). A variety of national credit systems have developed in 
historically specific ways so that money owners can move money capital into different 
economic sectors and across borders in search of valorisation. Likewise, fictitious capital 
claims (defined as capitalised claims to profit convertible into money) have assumed 
increased global importance in the form of shares, bonds, credits, and financial derivatives 
based on expected future surplus value extraction, profits, and, in the public sphere, tax 
revenues that do not yet exist (Harvey, 1999, pp. 265-67).  
These flows of capital, money, and credit – and their underlying class relations and 
institutionalised frameworks managed by states – constitute the world market. So while for 
Marx the mobility of capital is inherently global (1973, 408), the accumulation of money 
capital necessarily involves momentary fixity in order to appropriate labour power and use 
nature in the production and realisation of surplus-value as profit (Harvey, 2001, p. 312). 
Once value is produced, it can circulate as money and come to rest in another spatial fix. 
This territorialised reproduction of global capitalist social relations is structured by 
competitive imperatives to accumulate money capital, which reproduces and continually 
reworks the tensions between capital mobility and fixity (Henwood, 1998, p. 231). 
Competitive processes are shaped by inter- and intra-class struggles but are not reducible 
to class relations since these occur through pre-existing and complex institutionalisations 
of power, notably the state. From a historical materialist approach, social class is not just 
the division of society according to one’s income or market power but rather an 
understanding of social relationships of (re)production that place historical beings into 
situations of antagonism: capitalists control the appropriation of surplus that workers 
produce with their labour power, which workers must sell in order to survive (Foster, 1990, 
80-1). States, therein, are the one institution that the reproduction of capitalist relations 
cannot do without. 
The relationship between states, classes, and capital fixity and mobility today exists 
within a phase of global capitalism increasingly subject to financial imperatives. Money, 
credit, and fictitious capital claims have grown quantitatively more significant in 
accumulation and qualitatively more powerful in shaping how state authorities formulate 
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policy and individuals reproduce their lives (Lapavitsas, 2009; Marois, 2012). The rise of 
financial imperatives has created differences within the capitalist class and blurred once 
clearer articulations to capital mobility and fixity. For instance, the securitisation of fixed 
real estate investment and productive processes can create highly mobile fictitious capital 
claims (Fox Gotham, 2009, pp. 355-71). Global production firms that trade in stock 
exchanges and deal with financial derivatives must fix their investments in low cost 
locations to produce profits.  
Social classes are connected to, constrained by, and shape the institutionalised 
political and economic practices of the state (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 25; cf. Jessop, 2010). 
The outcomes of social struggles can be conceived of as fixed but malleable 
institutionalisations of power relations, which are rooted in class but equally include 
institutionalised gendered, racialised, and imperial power relations. The state remains 
central to the reproduction of capital fixity and mobility relationships and, by implication, to 
the mediation of underlying social and class conflicts (Brenner, 1998; Brenner and Elden, 
2009). The relocation or deterritorialisation of production and investment via money occurs 
across state borders just as is capital’s re-territorialisation must occur in specific political 
jurisdictions (Brenner, 1998; Bryan, 2001, pp. 64-5). In doing so, capital modifies and is 
modified by each state’s specific institutional matrix. How recurrent tensions between the 
fixity and mobility of capital are politically mediated and institutionally resolved (however 
fleeting) by state authorities depends on the historical specificity of domestically situated 
class and power struggles vis-à-vis world market imperatives and one’s relative position 
within the hierarchy of states (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 73). In brief, the state is necessarily 
embedded in and party to processes of capital fixity and mobility. 
To sum up, our historical materialist geographical framework offers three distinctive 
interpretive advantages. First, our framework emphasises that the spread and 
intensification of market-rule are not processes automatically and seamlessly activated by 
capitalist corporations or agentless structures but are rather everywhere institutionally 
implemented and domestically mediated by state authorities (themselves subject to 
heterogeneous and contending social forces and world market competitive imperatives). 
Second, it outlines a class-based framework of how processes of fixity and mobility are 
internalised within capitalist firms, which leads to a more concrete and nuanced 
understanding of capitalist accumulation strategies. Third, as an historicised and social 
understanding, this framework leaves open possibilities of change beyond capitalism 
through social agents’ struggles, whose outcomes can institutionalise new relationships of 
power. Given this analytical framework, our study contributes to the variegated 




A BRIEF HISTORY TO CAPITAL FIXITY AND MOBILITY IN MEXICO AND TURKEY 
 
In the postwar era Mexico’s and Turkey’s states, as historical institutionalisations of power, 
comprised the hubs through which capital mobility and fixity was mediated, accumulation 
strategies shaped, and unequal class relations maintained – in momentarily fixed but 
constantly evolving ways. Specifically, import substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
developmental strategies aimed at fixing capital (and associated class-based relations of 
production) within their borders. This ISI strategy was state-led as governing authorities 
directly supported production for the domestic market and the sequencing of expanding 
manufacturing capacity to replace imports through a range of trade and investment 
restrictions and protections, government subsidies, labour regulations, planned domestic 
investment, public infrastructure building, and market expansion. The emergence of the 
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large domestic (often family-based) holding groups was premised on supportive state 
policies and public sector inputs, which together resulted in a peripheral structural 
coherence premised on exploitative productive, political, and social relations that 
disproportionately benefited domestic capital, even as organised labour made some 
relative distributional gains (cf. Marois, 2012, p. 68). State financial institutions, from the 
central bank to different state-owned banks, played strategic supportive roles in managing 
flows of capital within Mexico and Turkey and from abroad. Consequently, the large 
holding groups’ accumulation strategies much more tightly articulated around capital fixity 
than mobility.  
This is not to say that Mexico and Turkey were delinked from world markets and 
that relative fixity implies systemic stability. Indeed, international trade occurred with 
regularity and the holding groups’ banking arms formed nascent ties with US and 
European banking syndicates (and hence to international capital mobility) (White, 1992, p. 
59; Gültekin-Karakaş, 2008). Still, while state authorities welcomed, under certain 
restrictions, the internalisation of foreign capital, authorities nonetheless heavily 
constrained the mobility of the holding groups’ financial assets abroad deeming domestic 
capital controls as necessary for national developmental processes (Solís, 1997, p. 19; 
Aydın, 2005, p. 35). Postwar class compromises saw the holding groups’ profits reinvested 
in the national fixity of their capital, albeit increasingly concentrated around Mexico’s and 
Turkey’s three largest urban centres. Such ISI trends are always differentiated. For 
example, even within Mexico’s ISI period capital mobility assumed a specific form of export 
processing zones (EPZs) that benefited mostly American companies via tax exemptions 
and access to cheap labour. Furthermore, through the 1960s and 1970s workers, 
students, and marginalised communities began to collectively challenge, often violently, 
the postwar social structures. The change to come, however, was not of the kind 
envisioned by these social forces. 
The neoliberal turn came forcefully with the 1979-82 US Volcker shock, which 
struck amidst waning US competitiveness and mounting third world indebtedness. In the 
global periphery, the shock triggered the 1980s debt crisis, which in turn triggered a phase 
of volatile, violent, and uneven neoliberal transformations. While occurring at different 
times, sequences, and speeds, in Mexico and Turkey the governments initiated radical 
export-oriented structural adjustment and privatisation programs and imposed tax and 
public service price increases on peasants, workers, and middle classes in order to help 
pay for foreign public debts (Correa, 2006, pp. 166-7; Yalman, 2002). State restructuring 
took the form of internalizing the emerging mobility needs of capital accumulation while 
jettisoning the demands of otherwise fixed labour. 
This first phase of neoliberal transition soon faced economic barriers, notably 
access to finance capital. To overcome this, both the Mexican and Turkish authorities re-
regulated money flows in 1989 by authoring capital account liberalisation. This 
simultaneously enabled the governments to (a) continue with their increasingly debt-led 
strategies of development (a corollary of reduced public enterprise and corporate taxation 
revenues) and (b) to enable large domestic firms and holding groups to move more wealth 
into speculative and risky, but ultimately lucrative, financial activities (Garrido, 2005, p. 
100; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 487). Continued neoliberal re-regulation 
encouraged, however unevenly, the centralisation and concentration of capital within the 
holding groups as they extended ownership and control, vertically and horizontally, over 
larger portions of their economies via mergers and acquisitions and privatisations cum 
public dispossessions with monetary support from new foreign financing and joint 
partnerships. The centralisation and concentration of capital at home, in turn, gave rise to 
the internationalisation of capital among Mexico’s and Turkey’s largest holding groups, 
especially following Mexico’s 1994 and Turkey’s 2001 crisis, as they sought accumulation 
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opportunities abroad. The profitability of these groups did not only rely on fixed production 
and sales at home but also on financial mobility within their countries and abroad, 
internalizing tensions within fixity and mobility. At the same time, foreign investment had 
vested interests in both fixed production costs within Mexico and Turkey as well as 
financial mobility. In this way, neoliberalism blurred former clear-cut divided interests of 
national and foreign capitalists as both relied on both fixity and mobility conditions in 
Mexico and Turkey.   
The 1989 capital account opening alongside Mexico’s and Turkey’s different 
neoliberal policy experiments opened these two societies to unprecedented market and 
financial risks. These exploded most impressively as Mexico’s 1994-95 and Turkey’s 2001 
financial crises (Marois, 2011). Far from reversing neoliberal experimentations and capital 
mobility, the state-authored rescues domestically fixed the costs of crisis resolution by 
socializing the financial debts gone bad. Governing authorities further protected capital 
mobility via new financial reforms intended to preserve, renew, and intensified the 
structurally unequal class relations of peripheral neoliberal capitalism. This is not to say 
authorities mechanically responded to the needs of capital. Various fractions of capital 
found Mexico’s and Turkey’s official responses too heavy on certain regulations. Still, after 
15 to 20 years of neoliberal reforms, the institutionalised social logic and competitive 
imperatives of neoliberalism meant authorities tended to act on behalf of capital, if not 
some imagined, homogenised behest. Consequently, while crisis hit at different times and 
recovery assumed case specific forms, Mexico’s and Turkey’s capitalist classes equally 
had to rethink their eroding postwar and emerging neoliberal articulations to capital 
mobility and fixity (and by extension capital-labour relations).  
 
Variegated Neoliberalisms 
What has been suggested so far, however truncated, concerns an underlying ontological 
and epistemological premise of our analysis that is tightly linked to capital fixity and 
mobility, namely variegated neoliberalism (Peck and Theodore 2007). Researchers 
working in this tradition understand neoliberalisation processes to be global in scope and 
involving historically specific waves and patterns of market-disciplinary regulatory 
restructuring that transpire in necessarily context-specific forms (Peck at al., 2012, 268). 
Our historical materialist approach is likewise concerned with how neoliberalisation is 
simultaneously patterned and interconnected as well as context-, time-, and place-specific. 
Yet a defining theoretical, methodological, and political challenge to investigate how 
concrete varieties of neoliberalism are also simultaneously constitutive of a generalised 
capitalist class project and form of contested social rule (Albo, 2005; cf. Brenner et al. 
2010a, p. 184).  
The concept of variegated neoliberalism is also intended to enable researchers 
tease out the success and the failures of local neoliberalisms, which over the last 30 years 
have led to further rounds of policy experimentation that in turn re-shape global policy 
frameworks (cf. Peck, 2004; Brenner et al. 2010). Neoliberal policy experimentation is not 
posed as an agentless process but as politically contested by individual and collective 
social agents in their struggles for economic and political power mediated by pre-existing 
structures and institutions of power. From our historical materialist approach, the 
‘internationalisation of the state’ is a useful, complementary conceptualisation. In contrast 
to conventional political economists’ ‘black boxes’, historical materialists interpret capitalist 
states as historically specific institutional crystallisations of class (and increasingly as 
equally gendered and racialised) power. The social content of states are thus always 
contested, which allows us to see non-determinist ways how state authorities have 
authored neoliberal globalisation (Albo 2005). The internationalisation of the state, if not 
strictly a precondition, is concomitant to the internationalisation of capital characteristic of 
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global neoliberalism. Without state authorities variously institutionalizing the relationships 
of power necessary for the recurrent deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of capital – 
perhaps nowhere more salient than in crisis resolution – you do not get global 
neoliberalism or a financial world market (cf. Brenner 1998). In case specific ways, the 
internationalization of the state assumes a dual form (Marois 2011, p.180). On the one 
hand, internationalisation implies that the internalised social logic and state officials is to 
manage their own domestic financial order in such a way that the international financial 
order is secured.  On the other hand, internationalisation involves these same actors 
insulating the state’s financial apparatus from domestic politics and popular influence. The 
internationalisation of the state thus embodies the institutional frameworks and material 
capacities to flexibly reproduce the structured coherence of neoliberal finance capitalism – 
according to equally flexible capital fixity and mobility accumulation strategies – amidst 
social contestation and recurrent and costly crises. Consequently, we suggest that the 
explicit combining of (a) a spatial analysis of capital fixity and mobility with (b) a 
conceptualisation of variegated neoliberalism yields a powerful historical materialist 
geographical explanatory framework from which we can better compare Mexico and 
Turkey’s context-dependent yet interconnected neoliberal responses to the 2008-09 crisis. 
 
{Insert Table 1 about here} 
 
 
THE VARIED REACTIONS OF CAPITAL TO THE 2008-09 CRISIS 
 
The three decades of variegated neoliberal transformation in Mexico and Turkey – 
characterised by uneven processes of capital centralisation, concentration, financialisation, 
and crisis – decidedly institutionalised the material interests of capital above those of the 
popular classes and set the historical context from which capital and state authorities 
responded to the 2008-09 global financial crisis’ impact on their societies. The crisis 
manifested in the form of mortgage foreclosures in the US, mainly subprime, collapsing 
mortgage lenders, investment banks and hedge funds collapsed in 2007 (Martin, 2011, pp. 
592-3). The financial crisis spread over global credit markets as returns on risk increased 
rapidly and liquidity diminished (Eichengreen et al., 2012, p. 1301). This crisis made 
evident how financial relations and debt were defined by neoliberalism, including previous 
rounds of polices, conflict and crisis, making blurry the division between public and 
corporate indebtedness (Soederberg, 2013, pp. 538-9). It is out of the scope of this paper 
to analyse the origins and impacts of this global crisis. Yet, the initial impact of the crisis in 
Europe and the US had serious consequences on Mexico and Turkey, as these countries 
rely economically for export markets and incoming investments. It is to these crisis-driven 
comparative effects that we now turn. 
Between 2008 and 2009, the specific competitive and accumulation strategies of 
different capitals in reaction to crisis in Mexico and Turkey varied according to their 
specific, state-mediated, articulations to fixity and mobility. A discussion of these 
articulations can reveal the powerful social agency of capital amidst crises. Such national 
variation among capitals, however, does not preclude identifying the generalizing thrusts 
within which differentiation occurs. We have identified three, including each society’s 
experiences with (1) capital flight; (2) reduced domestic production; and (3) changing 
articulations of capital to world market competitive imperatives.  
 
Capital Flight 
Mexico and Turkey both experienced capital flight. In Mexico capital flows in portfolio 
(liabilities) and foreign direct investment (FDI) decreased between 2007 and 2008 (Table 
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1). Mexican and foreign firms contributed to this form of capital mobility in different ways. 
Large Mexican corporations moved their money abroad as FDI: greenfield investment 
outside Mexico more than trebled from 842 million dollars in 2008 to 1.91 billion in 2009 to 
2.57 billion dollars in 2010 (UNCTAD, 2011, pp. 196, 207). Fearing instability and losses, 
foreign financial investors and banks simply drew their money capital out of the Mexican 
economy and moved it into other currencies, notably the US dollar. This caused Mexican 
stocks to decline as the Mexican peso depreciated by 4.2 per cent in 2008 (Froymovich, 
2009, p. C8). Capital flight also took very particular forms. For example, Citigroup’s 
Mexican banking subsidiary transferred 1.4 billion dollars to its American headquarters to 
re-capitalise its faltering, US-based fixed operations triggering cuts to new lending from 
Citibank’s more profitable Mexican operations  (Redacción, 2010). Large Mexican firms 
with investments in financial derivatives also contributed to capital outflows. These firms 
had used derivatives to obtain US dollar credits at low rates of interest, then servicing the 
loans with yields from domestic peso-denominated investments. In good times high profits 
derived from the difference between US lending rates and Mexican investment rates – the 
accumulation strategy premised on managing risks between foreign capital mobility and 
profitable domestic fixity. In the bad times, several Mexican firms reported massive losses 
in derivative operations, totalling some 8 billion dollars (US) between 2008 and 2009, 
which had to be paid for in US dollars (Reyes, 2009). 
In Turkey portfolio flows (liabilities) also reversed course between 2007 and 2008 
and FDI steadily fell between 2007 and 2009 (Table 1). In contrast to Mexico, however, 
Turkey’s largest corporations tended not to manage capital mobility/fixity tensions by 
moving their money abroad. Outward investment flows instead slowed from $2.6 billion in 
2008 to $1.6 billion in 2009 (Kadir Has 2011). A number of large corporations halted 
investments in a ‘wait and see’ strategy while others would take advantage of the state’s 
stimulus package and tax breaks to update operations at home. Foreign investors, in a 
flight to safety, shed holdings of stocks and bonds as the Istanbul Stock Exchange fell by 
35 per cent from mid-September 2008 to March 2009 (Özdabakoğlu, 2009). This put 
enormous pressure on the Turkish Lira (TL) – and state authorities by extension – as the 
US dollar soared by 40 per cent against it (Uygur, 2010, p. 56)]. The derivatives so 
important to Mexico, however, were relatively insignificant in Turkey and not a major 
source of capital flight (Özdabakoğlu, 2009). Much like Citibank Mexico, some foreign 
banks subsidiaries in Turkey, notably Fortis and Dexia, made extraordinary capital 
transfers home as one strategy to bolster their failing core European operations. Given the 
enormous profits generated by fixed banking operations in Turkey, most bank capital 
stayed put, despite modifying domestic liability compositions to reduce risk exposures. For 
example, the private banks generally rolled over existing loans but cut back on new loans 
in real terms. In Mexico and Turkey, pre-crisis fixity and mobility strategies were 
significantly affected by the 2008-09 crisis. This led to different forms of case-specific 
capital flight, but not universally. This in turn would shape and constrain authorities’ crisis 
responses, especially around interest rate, capital liquidity, and stimulus measures. 
 
Reduced Domestic Production 
In Mexico and Turkey the reactions of capital to crisis resulted in reduced domestic 
production. The 2008-09 crisis reduced effective demand globally, immediately impacting 
pre-crisis accumulation strategies vis-à-vis capital mobility and fixity in production leading 
to output cutbacks. In Mexico, fixed capital formation declined by 10 per cent between 
2008 and 2009 (INEGI, 2013). Capacity utilisation fell slightly from 79.7 per cent at the 
beginning of 2007 to 76.6 per cent at the end of 2009 (INEGI, 2013). At the same time, 
domestic aggregate demand declined in 2009; wages remained stagnant while prices rose 
faster than wages (Table 1). This partly stemmed from the accumulation strategies of 
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corporations in EPZs, which slowed production in Mexico and channelled the returns from 
sales of existing stocks to the repayment of financial obligations as a means of boosting 
the price of their bonds and stocks (Morales, 2010). At the same time, the initial 
devaluation of the peso lowered domestic production costs, reinforcing Mexico as an 
attractive FDI destination and partially offsetting the deterritorialisation of productive capital 
capacities. For example, electronics and auto suppliers in the EPZs benefited given rising 
wages in China and cheaper transportation costs to core American markets. Nonetheless, 
more people were without work, compelling authorities to respond. 
In Turkey, industrial output likewise fell as private fixed capital investments dropped 
by 10 per cent in 2009 (CBT, 2010, p. 33). Private domestic demand to GDP growth fell 
from 5 per cent in 2007 to -1.8 in 2008 to -8.3 in 2009 (IMF, 2012, p. 47). In a bid to 
eliminate existing stocks and overcapacity, manufacturers forced down capacity utilisation 
from about 80 per cent in 2007 to about 60 per cent by early 2009 (CBT, 2011, p. 10). 
Turkish exporters responded by forcing down fixed costs by maintaining wage increases 
below inflation, ordering work stoppages, and reducing staff numbers (Table 1; Öztürk, 
2012, p. 70). Other exporters responded by re-orienting Turkish exports to other-than-
Western markets (Uygur, 2010, p. 18). Maintaining profitability, not employment, was their 
primary concern. As neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican and Turkish states had largely 
released capital from any social and employment responsibilities, state authorities were 
thus faced with a growing and poorer reserve army of labour.  
 
Changing Articulations of Capital to World Market Competitive Imperatives 
The experiences of Mexico and Turkey reveal the complex and sometimes contradictory 
articulations of large domestic and foreign firms to capital mobility and fixity given world 
market competitive imperatives. In Mexico, large firms as well as domestic and foreign 
banks had more vested interests in capital fixity than foreign financial investors. The 
former relied more on their Mexican operations, domestic markets, and peso assets to 
realise an important share of their profits – even though international capital mobility 
offered them the possibility to escape capital devaluation and find cheaper production sites 
outside of Mexico. Some large Mexican firms also required a strong peso to reduce 
exchange rate risks in their own FDI and financial operations abroad. By contrast, 
exporting firms’ main interests coalesced around not only tax exemptions to maintain 
competitiveness but also around a relatively low exchange rate. Aside from the benefits 
that peso appreciation offered exporters when purchasing foreign inputs, a strong peso 
threatened underlying export competitiveness, diminishing other competitive gains made 
from intensifying exploitation of cheap, Mexican workers. Capitalist class interests evolved 
rather heterogeneously to the crisis as the interests of the export sector on peso 
devaluation diverged from financial investors, banks, and Mexican oligopolies, which tied 
their interests to a strong peso.  
In Turkey, foreign investors had the strongest interest in securing the open mobility 
of capital out of Turkey (and back in once conditions proved more favourable). Turkey’s 
large domestic holding groups’ (Istanbul capital) interests converged to some extent as 
they sought to secure profitability at home but to also augment competitiveness via 
renewed access to cheap foreign capital. Since internationalizing after the 1980s much of 
their domestic production is for export, yet many intermediate inputs and energy are still 
imported. This led major exporters, like the Istanbul capitals, to demand that the Central 
Bank of Turkey (CBT) intervene to moderate the TL exchange rate (neither let it appreciate 
nor depreciate too much in any direction). However, these groups’ assets also often 
include major domestic retail wings and media outlets. As the crisis intensified into 2009 
calls from a representative arm of Istanbul capital (TUSIAD) focused on the government 
also securing a deal with the IMF to decrease foreign borrowing costs by having state 
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authorities extend official guarantees on their debts – that is, subsidise the fixity of foreign 
finance. By contrast, a representative arm of smaller scale producers originating largely 
outside the major centres (that is, Anatolian capital often represented by MUSIAD) strongly 
resisted any IMF deal since it came with tax reform requirements that would impact them 
most directly and reduce competitiveness based on cheap labour costs.  
The varied reactions of capital (and state authorities below) to the 2008-09 crisis 
seemingly yielded positive ends as improved economic indicators in Mexico and Turkey 
seem to indicate. In Mexico and Turkey, GDP bounced back in 2010 and 2011, with 
Turkey’s outpacing Mexico (Table 1). The Mexican Stock Exchange rose 12.4 per cent 
from the beginning to the end of 2010. The Istanbul Stock Exchange 100 Index reached an 
all-time high with returns jumping 21 per cent in US dollar terms (BAT, 2012, viii). Mexican 
and Turkish bank profits (as return on equity) ranked near the top of the G-20 with 
Mexico’s banks hitting 16.8 per cent in 2010 and 15.5 in 2011 and Turkey’s banks 
outperforming at 23.9 in 2010 and 18.9 in 2011 (BAT, 2012a, p. 63). Inflation fell in both 
countries (Table 1). While not without reservations, capital in Mexico and Turkey – 
especially given the overarching context of the Great Recession in the advanced 
capitalisms – seemed to be doing phenomenally well. 
The crisis revealed variegated and changing articulations of capital in Mexico and 
Turkey to strategies of fixity and mobility. Ensuring sustainable profitability, rather than the 
national or international legal origin of firms, determined how capital altered their 
articulations to the national fixity or global mobility of capital for accumulation. This was 
reflected in the production decline and capital flight by both national and foreign capital in 
both Mexico and Turkey. Yet it would be simplistic to attribute their apparent successes to 
entrepreneurial vigour or to any structural decoupling of these two emerging capitalisms 
from the advanced capitalisms. As we see next, the different intra-class stakes and 
strategies emerged in tandem and through the internationalised state apparatus that 
mediated these capitals’ integration (or not) into the world market while maintaining the 
hardcore of neoliberal social rule at home. 
 
 
THE VARIED RESTUCTURINGS OF STATE  
 
The crisis-induced and varied rearticulations of capital to fixity and mobility strategies of 
accumulation neither occur in the absence of states nor simply parallel to states. Rather, 
capital fixity and mobility runs through states, is authored and modified by state authorities, 
and in turn differentially restructures states. In doing so, capital fixity and mobility are 
constitutive elements of the internationalised states’ evolving form, a state form that in turn 
impacts back upon capital accumulation strategies. How this occurs depends on the 
specificity of each state’s history, contemporary social formation, and relative position 
within the hierarchy of states. Such are the cases of the Mexican and Turkish states in 
2008-09. The crisis-induced and specific policy responses illustrate how officials sought to 
internalise and reconcile the contradictory tensions of capital fixity and mobility strategies 
within their borders. However modified in content, the internationalised state remains 
constant in its dual form of protecting the financial world market and reproducing neoliberal 
class rule domestically. National variation among states, thus, does not preclude 
identifying the generalizing thrusts within which policy differentiation occurs. We have 
identified five general categories within which differentiation occurs: (1) domestic interest 
rates; (2) international reserves; (3) public loan guarantees and access to liquidity; (4) 
taxation; and (5) stimulus. 
 
Domestic Interest Rates 
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Domestic interest rates became a focal point of policy formation in Mexico and Turkey. 
The Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) initially increased interest rates in 2008 from 7.50 to 
8.25 per cent to help fix portfolio investment in Mexico, to prevent devaluation of the peso, 
and to help moderate inflation (Banxico, 2009a, p.12). This move was consistent with 
Mexico’s neoliberal monetary policy of inflation targeting adopted in 2001: Banxico would 
raise the interbank overnight rate when inflation superseded the three per cent (and vice 
versa). The 2008 rate increase, however, neither stopped foreign investors exiting Mexico 
nor prices from increasing. Instead, the rate increase negatively impacted economic 
growth as firms’ credit costs rose. Fearing an exacerbation of the crisis via further 
domestic contractions, Banxico switched from protecting against capital mobility (exit) to 
privileging domestic firms’ fixity strategies by cutting interest rates from 8.25 per cent to 
4.50 per cent in 2009. 
In Turkey the response differed insofar as the CBT immediately and systematically 
slashed its policy rate with the onset of crisis – from 16.75 per cent in October 2008 to 
6.75 per cent by October 2009 – in a move that was regarded as dangerously unorthodox 
(CBT, 2010, p. 6). Yet contrary to conventional thought, inflation fell to 6.5 per cent, its 
lowest level since 1968. Because the CBT remained within its inflation targeting mandate 
(also adopted in 2001, following the crisis), this enabled the CBT to continue cutting 
interest rates, without fear of triggering capital flight, given the still much lower interest 
rates in the US (BAT, 2010, pp 1-2; BAT, 2009). Politically, state authorities pitched the 
response as breaking with Turkey’s historical peripheral and subordinate position in the 
financial world market. In practice, enabling cheaper money facilitated the stimulus 
package’s push for increased domestic consumption, geared towards supporting domestic 
fixed capital. 
In both Mexico and Turkey authorities dramatically reduced interest rates. Far from 
signally any new financial autonomy on the world stage, the moves were calculated and 
fairly low risk since interest rates in the advanced capitalisms, notably the US, had also 
fallen to historic lows. Global financial capital, in a period of extremely low returns, could 
still make good money off borrowing cheap and lending for more to Mexico and Turkey. 
This enabled authorities to more directly respond to the needs of fixed capital (that is, 
lower interest rates) within their borders. 
 
International Reserves 
Both Banxico and the CBT managed their international reserves in response to shifting 
capital mobility and fixity strategies. In Mexico, the initial depreciation of the peso amidst 
crisis generated losses in derivatives held by large Mexican firms. This in turn spiked 
demand for US dollars, contributing to the falling peso (some 25 per cent) (Banxico, 
2009b, p. 81). Banxico responded by using international reserves to stem further 
depreciation. State authorities sought to further guarantee liquidity through  a swap of 30 
billion dollars with the US Federal Reserve in 2008 and a 30 billion dollar Flexible Credit 
line with the IMF in 2009 (Banxico, 2009a, pp. 69-72). To further defend the Mexican peso, 
Banxico remunerated US dollar deposits kept in the central bank (Cuadra et al., 2010, p. 
288). This favoured both domestic and foreign capital as the former sought to decrease its 
debt in US dollars and the latter did not want the peso to lose value. Still wary of a sudden 
outflow of capital, the National Commission of Banking and Securities (CNBV) set limits on 
foreign bank profit repatriation. Authorities thus exercised the existing material capacity of 
the internationalised state, and fortified it via new international swap agreements and 
regulatory capacity. 
In Turkey, authorities also increased foreign exchange liquidity to help manage the 
crisis and to assist domestic capital service foreign commitments. However, given minimal 
exposure to derivative loses, this was to a lesser extent. The CBT did use international 
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reserves to help moderate TL exchange rate volatility, down 40 per cent to the US dollar 
(cf. BAT, 2010, pp. I-4). The falling TL had increased the repayment costs of foreign 
currency borrowings for large holding groups but increased Turkey’s export 
competitiveness. This benefited both Istanbul and Anatolian capitals tied into global trade. 
In a move particular to Turkey, state authorities sought to creatively draw in capital 
resources via re-regulation through the ‘Law on Repatriation of Capital or Tax Peace and 
Asset Repatriation Programme’ in 2008 (PDMR, 2009, p. 13). The voluntary scheme was 
framed politically in terms of generating a domestic economic boost by allowing individuals 
and corporations to repatriate previously unclaimed or illegally held foreign assets legally 
(the ‘Peace’ aspect) – subject to a minimal two per cent tax. The manoeuvre drew in over 
31 billion US dollars, creating a mere one billion dollars in tax revenue by the end of 2009. 
Throughout the crisis period, state authorities maintained a strategy of entertaining, if 
never formally completing, stand-by agreement talks with the IMF, which would have 
bolstered large corporations’ capacity to borrow internationally – but undermined the 
competitiveness of SME fixed capital in Turkey (Aydın, 2013, p. 104). 
International reserves now comprise a vital material resource of emerging capitalist 
internationalised states (built up since the volatile 1990s), which authorities mobilise in 
response to financial volatility. International reserves gives unprecedented capacity to 
states to smooth the shifting fixity and mobility strategies of capital. This material capacity 
is leveraged with other regulatory and international agreements intended to protect the 
financial world market’s integrity by directly implicating state resources. 
 
Public Loan Guarantees and Liquidity 
Mexico and Turkey offered different types of public loan guarantees and facilitated access 
to liquidity for the private sector. In Mexico, Banxico lent 3.22 billion US dollars to the 
commercial and development banks, drawing on the US Federal Reserve foreign currency 
swap, to support private firms (Banxico, 2010, pp. 69-72). Banxico also auctioned interest 
rate swaps for up to 50 million US dollars in 2009. The auctions enabled credit institutions 
to reduce their financial risks by transforming long-term fixed rate assets into short-term 
instruments with variable rates (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 292-3). Official re-regulation then 
allowed commercial banks to use new eligible assets as collateral to access liquidity from 
Banxico at lower rates. The state-owned development bank (NAFIN) provided short-term 
financing in the form of guarantees on securities issued by firms, insuring up to 50 per cent 
of the securities issued (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 291-2). By essentially socializing the risks, 
the public loans guaranteed the private sectors’ securities. As traded securities, then, only 
a handful of firms benefited due to the concentration of the Mexican stock exchange (BMV, 
2010, p. 36). In these ways, the mediation of Mexico’s largest capitals’ fixity and mobility 
accumulation strategies passed directly through the state. 
In Turkey, state authorities responded by directing public loan guarantees and 
credit supports towards key economic areas like agriculture, SMEs, and large firms. This 
was done mainly, but not exclusively, through the two large Turkish state-owned banks, 
Ziraat and Halk. These banks increased loans from between 15 to 25 per cent in 2009 
over 2008 levels (BAT, 2010, pp. I-3). State authorities also increased the credit and 
guarantee levels of the state-owned Export Credit Bank of Turkey. To stem any possible 
gutting of the domestic banks’ capital base, the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency (BRSA) began authorizing all banks’ distributions of earnings to shareholders in 
2009. BRSA re-regulation in January 2009 then allowed the banks to restructure and 
reclassify effectively non-performing securities and loans as ‘performing’. This gave the 
appearance of financial health, thus easing FX lending terms, interest rates, and reserve 
requirements (cf. IMF, 2010b; CBT, 2010, p. 37). In re-regulating capital Turkish state 
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authorities aimed to increased domestic liquidity, but the private banks responded by 
cutting lending to mitigate their own risks to capital accumulation. 
In both countries the governments mobilised public resources and guarantees, 
without democratic consultation, to help underwrite the sustainability of capital 
accumulation in different ways within their borders. This suggests nothing like the withering 
away of state capacity, but demonstrates far more robust capacity to protect financial flows 
on behalf of capital. Similar to international reserves, public loan guarantees and liquidity 
allowed Mexican and Turkish state authorities to mediate the firms’ interest in fixity and 
mobility. At the same time, state authorities claimed that these loans were necessary to 
revitalize their economies as firms would reinvest state resources in the domestic 
economy, providing employment. As seen in the reaction of domestic capital to the 2008-
09 and previous rounds of neoliberal restructuring, the former claim has never 




Mexican and Turkish state authorities unrolled limited, and distinct, stimulus packages. In 
Mexico, stimulus was launched in late 2008 and mostly promoted investment in 
infrastructure and expanded access to credit for the construction sector as well as for 
private and public mortgage institutions (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011; FMI, 2011, p. 40). 
The stimulus also included subsidies for exporting companies producing vehicles, auto 
parts, electronics and machinery to maintain their fixed operations in Mexico. The Ministry 
of the Economy, moreover, allowed companies to have production stoppages, with the 
state absorbing some of the labour costs. In exchange, any job cuts had to be limited to a 
third of the decline of sales (Galhardi, 2010, pp. 1-2). To manage social discontent with the 
least cost to capital, the Ministry of the Economy channelled some resources into 
expanded social security coverage and retirement schemes to aid forced redundancies 
(ILO, 2010). Notwithstanding the budget for poverty alleviation (Oportunidades) increased 
60 per cent (Feliz Herrera, 2011), stimulus support for relatively mobile capital far 
outstripped support for relatively fixed workers and the poor. This stimulus package 
represented 1.6 per cent of Mexico’s 2009 GDP.  
In Turkey, stimulus was delayed into March 2009 in order to be unveiled just ahead 
of local elections. The package focused primarily on apparently populist measures aimed 
at raising domestic consumption through VAT reductions, with the unstated intent being to 
help reduce domestic capitals’ overproduction stocks (hence, supporting accumulation 
strategies of capital fixity) (OECD, 2012, p. 14; Öniş and Güven, 2011, p. 5). Secondarily, 
the stimulus assisted infrastructure expenditures in the politically-charged Southeastern 
Anatolia Project while corporate tax breaks aided the equally politically-charged relocation 
of production to eastern Turkey (PDMR, 2009, p. 13). The crisis provided an opportunity to 
complement the existing regional development strategy of shifting labour intensive but 
globally competitive production to predominantly Kurdish areas, where labour costs are 
much reduced (Öztürk, 2012, p. 72). To further buttress the consumption-based stimulus 
strategy, modest unemployment benefits, temporary and part-time employment schemes 
were extended, and a new program for temporary public employment vocational training 
was created. The overall stimulus package represented 3.4 per cent of 2009 GDP. 
Distinctively, stimulus took the form of channelling public resources into capital 
accumulation supports, with a portion of this being siphoned off to ease the social 
dislocations generated by the crisis and responses of capital (notably, as per above, by 
reducing employment and wages). State authorities sought to mediate capital’s 
contradictory fixity and mobility demands through variously structured public stimulus 
packages and loans guarantees, all of which shared common ground insofar as the costs 
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and competitiveness adjustment would fall disproportionately onto labour (Marois 2014). At 
the same time, authorities exerted new institutional capacities through stimulus that , for 




Mexican and Turkish authorities manipulated taxation regulations, but in different ways. In 
Mexico, ensuring profitable yields in public debt, which sustained reserve accumulation 
and a strong peso, required public debt repayment, which required an increase in non-oil 
public revenues. To also help finance policy responses of 2008-09, the PAN 
Administration increased taxes in 2010: the value-added tax (VAT) by one per cent and 
income tax by three per cent. Non-oil revenues consequently grew 12.1 and 2.4 per cent in 
2010 and 2011 respectively. The increase in VAT revenue was especially regressive but 
central to the mediation of internalised tensions of capital fixity and mobility within 
neoliberalism. The financially oriented large Mexican companies and financial investors 
received the benefits of the revenue through stimulus and supports (while being able to 
claim credits against VAT expenditures), but authorities impose the costs of crisis and 
recovery disproportionately onto the middle and working classes (who have few means to 
escape VAT payments) (cf. Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011, p. 27). Adding insult to injury, 
stock market and other financial markets operations remained tax exempted. 
In Turkey, the authorities did not increase taxes. This was enabled in part because 
the Turkish Treasury entered the crisis with a relatively favourable 1.8 per cent budget 
surplus. To finance its stimulus package and promote populist consumption, authorities 
thus relied on increasing public debt [which increased from 40 to 46 per cent of GDP 
between 2008 and 2009 (Table 1)]. In fact, the authorities reduced VAT on domestically 
produced automobiles, consumer durables, and heavy-duty machines and equipment from 
18 per cent to 8 per cent to boost consumption. This VAT cut also applied to computers, 
IT, office technologies, and office furniture as well as for SME purchases of industrial 
machines. While the stimulus costs were not immediately socialised by VAT increases, the 
costs were nonetheless displaced in time and to be paid with future tax revenues – and 
hence fall onto the working classes disproportionately. This too combated capital flight. 
Authorities were keen to maintain Turkey’s preceding trend of internalizing public debts, 
and the domestic banks were eager to draw on this widening stream of public debt 
investments (that is, fictitious capital). Still, global instabilities and threat of capital flight 
meant authorities nonetheless had to contend with contracting debt maturity periods 
(PDMR, 2009, pp. 15, 18). 
In distinct ways, taxation (or lack thereof) proved a highly flexible means by which 
state authorities could bridge some of the intra-class tensions and barriers to capital 
accumulation erected by the crisis to the benefit of capital. Most notably, neoliberal 
taxation pushes the costs of crisis management onto the popular classes (Marois 2014). 
But both cases also reflect the capacity of state authorities to undertake such measures 
without popular consultation and in ways that can secure the relative needs of greater 
mobility (Mexico and finance) or greater fixity (Turkey and consumption). 
At this point it is important to emphasise that the evident policy differentiation 
between Mexico and Turkey does not imply that the universal constraints and imperatives 
of neoliberal financial capitalism are absent. Indeed, two constants remain. One, state 
authorities have deeply internalised the logic of capital accumulation in crisis response 
policy formation. Two, the state-authored displacement of the costs of crisis and recovery 
fall systematically onto labour. Workers are the fulcrum around which state authorities 
have domestically mediated the contradictions between fixity and mobility accumulation 
strategies among the capitalist classes during the 2008-09 crisis. While our analysis has 
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focused on the reactions of capital and state, it has also suggested the impacts on labour. 
The full extent of this class-based displacement requires directed analysis in itself. Indeed, 
while crises are displaced in time and space by means of financial mobility, it is equally so 
that in doing so capital passes through the neoliberal and internationalised state 
apparatus, which has developed material and institutional capacity to push the costs of 
crisis and recovery onto the working classes.  
While the costs of crisis resolution falls onto labour, this is consistent with the anti-
labour trajectory of neoliberal development strategies. Aside from perhaps maintaining a 
job for which they are effectively making less doing, the average worker has come out 
poorer from the 2008-09 crisis. The stimulus packages have not reduced unemployment 
rates significantly since 2009 and real minimum wages have decreased while prices have 
increased faster than wages (Table 1). This is consistent with three decades neoliberalism, 
wherein, according to the OECD (2011), Mexico and Turkey remain among the worst off in 
the OECD despite impressive post-crisis GDP growth indicators. These two societies are 
the second and third most unequal within the OECD by the Gini coefficient. Mexico ranks 
the worst in poverty protection while Turkey sits at fifth worst. In terms of the enigmatic 
OECD ‘social justice’ indicator, Turkey ranks the worst followed immediately by Mexico. 
The constitutive processes of the internationalisation of state and capital, and how 
these are modified at times of crisis and in lieu of shifting fixity and mobility accumulation 
strategies, are premised on subordinating working class aspirations and material gains. 
We see this in the cases of Mexico and Turkey, but this is a global tendency to which 
these societies are a part. Evidence released in a recent ILO report suggests that financial 
globalisation has weakened workers’ collective bargaining power and, in turn, led to a 
falling wage share for workers (2013, 50-3). The ILO report pointedly contends, 
“financialisation stands as the single most adverse factor in terms of explaining the decline 
of labour income” (2013, 53). Throughout, official responses’ to crisis (though processes of 






Conventional economists, international financial institutions and domestic authorities 
premised much of their response to the 2008-9 crisis on ideas that national capital would 
be more loyal to the home economy and, if enticed and supported to stay with public 
funds, would regenerate domestic employment and economic growth (Andersen, 2009). 
This premise ignores how domestic capitalists have as much material interest as foreign 
capitalists in moving their money abroad to protect accumulation. It equally ignores how 
state authorities might have as much material interest in protecting the needs of foreign 
(as much as domestic) financial capital given the constraints of debt-led development and 
an increasingly powerful financial world market. Consequently, the conventional wisdom 
behind crisis-induced state interventions end up strengthening existing domestic and 
global structures of class power instead of improving the living conditions of the majority. 
Such are the cases of Mexico and Turkey. While differing in specific content, the 
responses of capital and state to the crisis ensured continuity in their foregoing neoliberal 
strategies of development. The prevailing strategy of capital accumulation and social rule 
continues to be variegated neoliberalism (cf. Peck et al. 2012).  
Our historical materialist geographical framework has also generated three 
interventions, which need singling out. First, the spatial dynamics of capital fixity and 
mobility in emerging capitalisms add something unique to our understanding of global 
capitalism. Notably, these emerging capitalist societies and social agents are not merely 
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passive recipients of ‘neoliberalism’ but are constitutive active social agents in 
neoliberalism’s global maintenance and restructuring.  
Second, deepening comparative analyses beyond institutions through a lens of 
capital fixity and mobility can expose important agential dynamics that are deeply class-
based. This lens exposes the underlying class dynamics and institutionalised, but shifting, 
mechanisms of oppression that prevail through various policy manifestations. 
Neoliberalism is thus not defined by any specific matrix of policies (for then we may well be 
in a post-neoliberal world) but rather by the organised strategies of capitalist agents to 
subordinate and defeat of organised labour and popular classes’ capacity to resist market-
oriented restructuring and austerity that disproportionately benefit capital. 
Third, while offering to a distinct understanding of what is, so too can a critical 
assessment of fixity and mobility help inform progressive alternative policies and 
institutions. For our purposes, we can signal two fruitful directions for research. The first 
direction is the need to locate power relations along the lines of capital mobility and fixity in 
order to critically analyse the progressive limits of domestic stimulus packages amidst 
crisis. Without doing so, domestic stimulus packages end up reinforcing existing and 
unequal structures of capitalist power within a country, which in turn reinforces oppressive 
world market structures. The second direction regards the importance of understanding 
emerging capitalisms as central spaces in the constitution of global frameworks of 
neoliberalism rather than passive, peripheral ones. Such a view emphasises the necessity 
of progressive social change in these societies as part and parcel to alternative policy 
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Table 1: Comparative Indicators, Mexico and Turkey, 2007 to 2012  
Indicator Countr
y 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  
GDP Growth Turkey 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.0 7.5 2.0 
 Mexico 3.4 1.2 -6.0 5.6 3.9 3.8 
Public sector debt as per cent 
of GDP 
Turkey 39.9 40.0 46.1 42.2 39.1 36.2 
 Mexico 37.8 43.1 44.5 42.9 43.8 43.1 
Unemployment rate Turkey 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 - - 
 Mexico 3.7 4.0 5.5 5.4 5.2 4.8 
Foreign direct investment (net, 
billions $) 
Turkey 19.9 17.0 6.9 7.8 12.6 16.2 
 Mexico 31.3 27.8 16.5 21.3 21.6 12.6 
Portfolio investment assets 
(billions $) net acquisition 




 Mexico 14.7 -
14.2 
34.5 5.4 -6.0 8.3 
Portfolio investment liabilities 
(net incurrence of liabilities)  
Turkey 2.8 -3.8 2.9 19.6 19.3 38.1 
 Mexico 13.3 4.8 15.3 37.7 40.6 81.3 
Gross foreign reserves (CBT); 
(billions $) 
Turkey 76.2 74.0 73.8 86.6 90.1 86.3 




Real minimum wages (US 
dollars per hour) 
Turkey 3.4 3.4 2.9 3 2.8 2.7 
 Mexico 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Consumer prices (index 
2005=100) 












Inflation  Turkey -- 10.4 6.3 8.6 6.5 8.9 
 Mexico -- 5.1 5.3 4.2 3.4 4.1 
IMF 2012a, 47-55; BAT 2012, vi-vii; IMF 2012b (Mexico), 30; 33, 34; INEGI, 2013; IMF Data Mapper 
(http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/);  OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org); UNCTAD Stat  
(http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx). 
 
